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Abstract: Taking the move from our recent research on GNSS Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA),
this article investigates the synergies of ABIA with a novel Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) architecture for Remotely
Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS). Based on simulation and experimental data collected on a variety of manned and
unmanned aircraft, it was observed that the integration of ABIA with DAA has the potential to provide an
integrity-augmented DAA for both cooperative and non-cooperative applications. The candidate DAA system uses
various Forward-Looking Sensors (FLS) for the non-cooperative case and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) in addition to TCAS/ASAS for the cooperative case. Both in the cooperative and non-
cooperative cases, the risk of collision is evaluated by setting a threshold on the Probability Density Function
(PDF) of a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) event over the separation area. So, if the specified threshold is
exceeded, an avoidance manoeuvre is performed based on a heading-based Differential Geometry (DG) algorithm
and optimized utilizing a cost function with minimum time constraints and fuel penalty criteria weighted as a
function of separation distance. Additionally, the optimised avoidance trajectory considers the constraints imposed
by the ABIA in terms of RPAS platform dynamics and GNSS constellation satellite elevation angles, preventing
degradation or losses of navigation data during the whole DAA loop. This integration scheme allows real-time
trajectory corrections to re-establish the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) when actual GNSS accuracy
degradations and/or data losses take place (e.g., due to aircraft-satellite relative geometry, GNSS receiver tracking,
interference, jamming or other external factors). Cooperative and non-cooperative simulation case studies were
accomplished to evaluate the performance of this Integrity-Augmented DAA (IAS) architecture. The selected host
platform was the AEROSONDE RPAS and the simulation cases were performed in a representative cross-section
of the RPAS operational flight envelope. The simulation results show that the proposed IAS architecture is capable
of performing high-integrity conflict detection and resolution when GNSS is the primary source of navigation data.
Introduction
In addition to Space Based Augmentation Systems
(SBAS) and Ground Based Augmentation Systems
(GBAS), Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) augmentation can also take the form of
additional information being provided by other
avionic systems. In most cases, the additional avionic
systems operate via separate principles than the
GNSS and, therefore, are not subject to the same
sources of error or interference. A system such as
this is referred to as an Avionics-Based or Aircraft-
Based Augmentation System (ABAS). While GBAS
and SBAS address all four cornerstones of GNSS
performance augmentation (i.e., accuracy, integrity,
availability and continuity), the ABAS approach is
particularly well suited to increase the levels of
integrity and accuracy of GNSS in a variety of
mission- and safety-critical aviation applications. In
RPAS applications, airworthiness drivers for both
cooperative and non-cooperative Detect-and-Avoid
(DAA) impose stringent GNSS data integrity
requirements. Therefore, a properly designed and
certifiable Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation
(ABIA) capability would allow an extended
spectrum of autonomous and safety-critical
operations by continuously monitoring GNSS
integrity levels and providing suitable caution and
warning signals to the remote pilot or to the avionics
flight control systems in order to accomplish GNSS-
based mission and safety-critical tasks. This
increased level of integrity could provide a pathway
to support the challenging task of RPAS certification
for unrestricted access to commercial airspace.
Although current and likely future SBAS/GBAS
augmentation systems can provide significant
improvement of GNSS navigation performance, a
properly designed and flight certified ABAS/ABIA
system could play a key role in GNSS integrity
augmentation for aviation safety-critical applications,
including RPAS DAA. Furthermore, using suitable
data link and data processing technologies on the
ground, a certified ABAS/ABIA capability could be
one of the core elements of a future GNSS Space-
Ground-Avionics Augmentation Network (SGAAN).
ABIA Research
Previous research on ABIA systems demonstrated
the potential of this technology to enhance GNSS
integrity performance in a variety of mission- and
safety-critical applications including experimental
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flight test/flight inspection, precision approach and
automatic landing [1-5]. Therefore, an advanced
ABIA system was developed for RPAS applications
(Figure 1). In this system, the on-board sensors
provide information on the aircraft relevant flight
parameters (navigation data, engine settings, etc.) to
an Integrity Flag Generator (IFG), which is also
connected to the GNSS system. Using the available
data on GNSS and the relevant aircraft flight
parameters, integrity signals are generated which can
be sent to the RPAS Ground Station (RGS) or used
by a Flight Path Optimisation Module (FPOM). This
system addresses both the predictive and reactive
nature of GNSS integrity augmentation by producing
suitable integrity flags (cautions and warnings) in
case of predicted/ascertained GNSS data losses or
unacceptable signal degradations exceeding the
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) specified
for each phase of flight, and providing guidance
information to the remote pilot/autopilot to avoid
further data losses/degradations.
Figure 1 ABIA system architecture for RPAS
applications
To achieve this, an Integrity Flag Generator (IFG)
module produces the following integrity flags [1-3]:
 Caution Integrity Flag (CIF): a predictive
annunciation that the GNSS data delivered to the
avionics system is going to exceed the RNP
thresholds specified for the current and planned
flight operational tasks (GNSS alert status).
 Warning Integrity Flag (WIF): a reactive
annunciation that the GNSS data delivered to the
avionics system has exceeded the RNP thresholds
specified for the current flight operational task
(GNSS fault status).
The following definitions of Time-to-Alert (TTA)
are applicable to the ABIA system [1]:
 ABIA Time-to-Caution (TTC): the minimum
time allowed for the caution flag to be provided
to the user before the onset of a GNSS fault
resulting in an unsafe condition.
 ABIA Time-to-Warning (TTW): the maximum
time allowed from the moment a GNSS fault
resulting in an unsafe condition is detected to the
moment that the ABIA system provides a
warning flag to the user.
ABIA Integrity Flag Generator (IFG)
The main causes of GNSS data degradation or signal
losses in aviation applications were deeply analysed
in [1] and are listed below:
 Antenna obscuration (i.e., obstructions from the
wings, fuselage and empennage during
maneuvers);
 Adverse satellite geometry, resulting in high
Position Dilution of Precision (PDOP);
 Fading, resulting in reduced carrier-to-noise
ratios (C/N0);
 Doppler shift, impacting signal tracking and
acquisition/reacquisition time;
 Multipath effects, leading to a reduced C/N0 and
to range/phase errors;
 Interference and jamming.
Understanding the physics of these phenomena and
developing reliable mathematical models was
essential in order to properly design the ABIA IFG
module [1, 2]. Figure 2 shows the architecture of the
IFG module and its interfaces.
Figure 2 ABIA IFG module architecture
The ABIA IFG module is designed to provide CIF
and WIF alerts in real-time (i.e., in accordance with
the specified TTC and TTW requirements in all
relevant flight phases). IFG module inputs are from
the GNSS receiver and other aircraft sensors. The
GNSS and Sensors Layer (GSL) passes the aircraft
Position, Velocity, Time (PVT) and attitude (Euler
angles) data (from the on board Inertial Navigation
Systems, Air Data Computer, etc.), GNSS data (raw
measurements and PVT) and the Flight Control
System (FCS) actuators data to the Data Extraction
Layer (DEL). At this stage, the required Navigation
and Flight Dynamics (NFD) and GNSS Constellation
Data (GCD) are extracted, together with the relevant
information from an aircraft Three-Dimensional
Model (3DM) and from a Terrain and Objects
Database (TOD). The 3DM database is a detailed
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geometric model of the aircraft built in a Computer
Aided Three-dimensional Interactive Application
(CATIA). The TOD uses a Digital Terrain Elevation
Database (DTED) and additional man-made objects
data to obtain a detailed map of the surfaces
neighbouring the aircraft. In the Integrity Processing
Layer (IPL), the Doppler Analysis Module (DAM)
calculates the Doppler shift by processing the NFD
and GCD inputs. The Multipath Analysis Module
(MAM) processes the 3DM, TOD, GNSS
Constellation Module (GCM) and A/C
Navigation/Dynamics Module (ADM) inputs to
determine multipath contributions from the aircraft
(wings/fuselage) and from the terrain/objects close to
the aircraft. The Obscuration Analysis Module
(OAM) receives inputs from the 3DM, GCS and
ADS, and computes the GNSS antenna obscuration
matrixes corresponding to the various aircraft
manoeuvres. The Signal Analysis Module (SAM)
calculates the C/N0 of the direct GNSS signals
received by the aircraft in the presence of
atmospheric propagation disturbances, as well as the
applicable radio frequency interference and
Jamming-to-Signal ratio (J/S) levels. The Integrity
Flags Layer (IFL) uses a set of predefined CIF/WIF
threshold parameters to trigger the generation of both
caution and warning flags associated with antenna
obscuration, Doppler shift, multipath, carrier,
interference and satellite geometry degradations. The
approach adopted to set-up thresholds for the ABIA
CIF and WIF integrity flags is depicted in Figure 3.
The masking integrity flag criteria are the following:
 When the current aircraft manoeuvre will lead
to less than 4 satellite in view, the CIF shall be
generated.
 When less than 4 satellites are in view, the WIF
shall be generated.
Additionally, when only four satellites are in view:
 When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle
(antenna frame) is less than 10 degrees, CIF
shall be generated.
 When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle
is less than 5 degrees, WIF shall be generated.
From the definition of Dilution of Precision (DOP)
factors, GNSS accuracy can be expressed by [6]:
σ୔ = DOP × σ୙୉ୖ୉ (1)
where σ୔is the standard deviation of the positioning
accuracy and σ୙୉ୖ୉is the standard deviation of the
satellite pseudorange measurement error. Therefore,
the 1-sigma Estimated Position, Horizontal and
Vertical Errors of a GNSS receiver can be calculated
using the PDOP (EPE in 3D), the HDOP (EHE in
2D) or the VDOP (EVE). In order to generate CIFs
and WIFs that are consistent with current GNSS
RNP, we need to introduce the Horizontal and
Vertical Accuracy (HA/VA) requirements in the
various flight phases. The Horizontal Alert Limit
(HAL) is the radius of a circle in the horizontal
plane, with its centre being at the true position,
which describes the region which is required to
contain the indicated horizontal position with the
required probability for a particular navigation mode.
Similarly, the Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) is half the
length of a segment on the vertical axis, with its
centre being at the true position, which describes the
region which is required to contain the indicated
vertical position with the required probability for a
particular navigation mode. As a result of our
discussion, the DOP integrity flags criteria are the
following:
 When the EHE exceeds the HA 95% or the VA
95% alert requirements, the CIF shall be
generated.
 When the EHE exceeds the HAL or the EVE
exceeds the VAL, the WIF shall be generated.
Figure 3 Integrity flag thresholds
During the landing phase, a GNSS Landing System
(GLS) has to be augmented by GBAS in order to
achieve the RNP, as well as Lateral and Vertical
Protection Levels (LPL and VPL). LPL/VPL is
defined as the statistical error value that bounds the
Lateral/Vertical Navigation System Error (NSE) with
a specified level of confidence. In particular, for the
case of Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS),
which allows for multiple Differential Global
Positioning System (DGPS) reference receivers (up
to four) to be implemented, two different hypotheses
are made regarding the presence of errors in the
measurements. These hypotheses are:
H0 Hypothesis – No faults are present in the range
measurements (includes both the signal and the
receiver measurements) used in the ground station to
compute the differential corrections;
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H1 Hypothesis – A fault is present in one or more
range measurements and is caused by one of the
reference receivers used in the ground station.
Consequently, LPL and VPL are computed as
follows: LPL = MAX {LPLୌ଴, LPLୌଵ} (2)VPL = MAX {VPLୌ଴, VPLୌଵ} (3)
VPL and LPL for the H0 and H1 hypotheses are
calculated as described in [16]. The lateral and
vertical accuracy (NSE 95%) and alert limits
required by a GLS in the presence of LAAS,
considering the continuously varying position of the
aircraft with respect to the Landing Threshold Point
(LTP) are given in [7]. Additionally, [7] provides
the so-called Continuity of Protection Levels in
terms of Predicted Lateral and Vertical Protection
Levels (PLPL and PVPL). Although the definition
in [7] is quite comprehensive, a generic statement is
made that the PVPL and PLPL computations shall be
based on the ranging sources expected to be
available for the duration of the approach. In other
terms, it is implied that the airborne subsystem shall
determine which ranging sources are expected to be
available, including the ground subsystem’s
declaration of satellite differential correction
availability (satellite setting information).
Unfortunately, this generic definition does not
address the various conditions for satellite signal
losses associated to specific aircraft manoeuvres
(including curved GLS precision approaches).
Therefore, it is suggested that an extended definition
of PLPL and PVPL is developed taking into account
the continuously varying aircraft-satellite relative
geometry (masking envelope). In particular, when
the current aircraft manoeuvre will lead to less than 4
satellites in view or unacceptable accuracy
degradations, the CIF shall be generated. Following
our discussion, the additional integrity flags criteria
adopted for GLS in the presence of LAAS are the
following:
 When the PLPL exceeds LAL or PVPL exceeds
the VAL, the CIF shall be generated.
 When the LPL exceeds the LAL or the VPL
exceeds the VAL, the WIF shall be generated.
Multipath integrity flags were defined using the
Early-Late Phase (ELP) observable and the range
error [8]. As described in [2], the multipath integrity
flags criteria are the following:
 When the ELP exceeds 0.1 radians, the caution
integrity flag shall be generated.
 When the multipath range error exceeds 1
meter, the warning integrity flag shall be
generated.
In order to define the integrity thresholds associated
with Doppler and fading effects, a dedicated analysis
of the GNSS receiver tracking performance was
required. When the GNSS measurement errors
exceed certain thresholds, the receiver loses lock to
the satellites. Since both the code and carrier tracking
loops are nonlinear, especially near the threshold
regions, only Monte Carlo simulations of the GNSS
receiver in different dynamics and SNR conditions
can determine the receiver tracking performance [6,
9, 10]. Nevertheless, some conservative rule of
thumbs that approximate the measurement errors of
the GNSS tracking loops can be used. Numerous
sources of measurement errors affect the Phase Lock
Loop (PLL) and the Frequency Lock Loop (FLL).
However, for our purposes, it is sufficient to analyze
the dominant error sources in each type of tracking
loop. Considering a typical GNSS receivers
employing a two-quadrant arctangent discriminator,
the PLL threshold is given by [6]:
3σ୔୐୐ = 3σ୨+ θୣ ≤ 45
° (4)
where:
σ୨ = 1-sigma phase jitter from all sources except
dynamic stress error;
θୣ = dynamic stress error in the PLL tracking loop.
Frequency jitter due to thermal noise and dynamic
stress error are the main errors in a GNSS receiver
FLL. The receiver tracking threshold is such that the
3-sigma jitter must not exceed one-fourth of the
frequency pull-in range of the FLL discriminator.
Therefore, the FLL tracking threshold is [6]:
3σ୊୐୐ = 3σ୲୊୐୐ + fୣ ≤ 1/4T (Hz) (5)
where:
3σ୊୐୐ = 3-sigma thermal noise frequency jitter;
σ୲୊୐୐= dynamic stress error in the FLL tracking loop.
Regarding the code tracking loop, a conservative
rule-of-thumb for the Delay Lock Loop (DLL)
tracking threshold is that the 3-sigma value of the
jitter due to all sources of loop stress must not
exceed the correlator spacing (d), expressed in chips.
Therefore [6]:
3σୈ୐୐ = 3σ୲ୈ୐୐ + Rୣ ≤ d (chips) (6)
where:
σ୲ୈ୐୐ = 1-sigma thermal noise code tracking jitter;
Re = dynamic stress error in the DLL.
The Phase Lock Loop (PLL), FLL and DLL error
models described in [2] allow determining the C/N଴
corresponding to the receiver tracking thresholds.
The Scalar Tracking Loops (STL) typically employ
Delay Lock Loops (DLL) to track the code phase and
Phase Lock Loops (PLL) or Frequency Lock Loops
(FLL) to track the carrier phase. State-of-the-art STL
also employ combined PLL and FLL for carrier
tracking to obtain better results in navigation position
accuracy and enhanced tracking. Recently, Vector
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Tracking Loops (VTL) have been employed, which
are based on an advanced receiver architecture
capable of tracking signals in a combined manner.
VTL has the advantage of operating at a lower total
carrier power to noise ratio (C/No) and in higher
manoeuvrability when compared to STL logics. The
general C/N଴ integrity flag criterion applicable to the
ABIA system is:
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where (C/N଴)୔୐୐ is the minimum C/N଴ for PLL
tracking, (C/N଴)୊୐୐ is the minimum C/N଴ for FLL
tracking, (C/N଴)ୈ୐୐is the minimum C/N଴ for DLL
tracking, (C/N଴)୔୐୐ା୊୐୐ is the minimum C/N଴ for
combined PLL and FLL tracking and (C/N଴)୚୘୐is
the minimum C/N଴ for VTL based tracking.
Numerical solutions of Eqs. (4), (5) and (6) show
that the weak link in unaided avionics GNSS
receivers is the carrier tracking loop threshold
(greater sensitivity to dynamics stress). Therefore,
the (C/N଴)୔୐୐ threshold can be adopted in these
cases. In general, when the PLL loop order is made
higher, there is an improvement in dynamic stress
performance. Therefore, third order PLL are widely
adopted in avionics GNSS receivers. Assuming 15
to 18 Hz noise bandwidth and 5 to 20 msec
predetection integration time (typical values for
avionics receivers), the rule-of-thumb tracking
threshold for the PLL gives 25 to 28 dB-Hz.
Additionally, in aided avionics receiver applications,
the PLL tracking threshold can be significantly
reduced by using external velocity aiding in the
carrier tracking loop. With this provision, a tracking
threshold of approximately 15 to 18 dB-Hz can be
achieved. Using these theoretical and experimental
threshold values, we can also calculate the receiver
Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) performance for the various
cases of practical interest, as described in [1]. When
available, flight test data collected in representative
portions of the aircraft operational flight envelope (or
the results of Monte Carlo simulation) shall be used.
Taking an additional 5% margin on the 3-sigma
tracking thresholds for the CIF, the following
additional criteria are introduced for the ABIA
integrity thresholds:
 When either 42.25° ≤ 3σ୔୐୐ ≤ 45°or 0.2375T ≤ 3σ୊୐୐ ≤ 0.25T or 0.05d ≤
3σୈ୐୐ ≤ d, the CIF shall be generated.
 When either 3σ୔୐୐ > 45° or 3σ୊୐୐ > 1/4ܶor
3σୈ୐୐ > ݀the WIF shall be generated.
In avionics receivers, lock detectors are used to
assess if the satellite signals are being tracked or not
tracked. Code lock detection is very similar to
estimating the received C/N଴ , inferring that the
receiver is operating on or near the correlation peak.
Knowledge of code lock is obviously parallel to the
knowledge of received signal power. The receiver’s
code-correlation process has to raise the signal out of
the noise. The spread spectrum processing gain (G୮)
is defined as the ratio of the spread bandwidth to the
unspread (baseband) bandwidth and is expressed in
dB. The post-correlation signal-to-noise ratio can be
calculated by [11]:(S/N)୮୭ୱ୲ି ୡ୭୰୰. = (S/N)୮୰ୣ ିୡ୭୰୰. + G୮ (8)
When the receiver code is aligned with the
transmitted code, the signal power at the band pass
output is crushed into approximately 100 Hz of
bandwidth. The processing gain can be calculated
from: G୔ = 10 logቀଶେ౎୘ీ ቁ(dB) (9)
where CR is the chipping rate and TD is the data
period. For the C/A-code this works out to be about
43 dB. Typical avionics receivers have a cut off
value at 10 dB, which means that if the value is less
than this the satellite signal level is too low to be
used in the positioning computations [12]. Therefore,
an additional threshold to be accounted for is:S/N୮୭ୱ୲ି ୡ୭୰୰. = S/N୮୰ୣ ିୡ୭୰୰. + G୮ ³ 10 dB (10)
During experimental flight test activities performed
with unaided L1 C/A code avionics receivers, it was
also found that, in a variety of dynamics conditions,
a C/N଴ of 25 dB-Hz was sufficient to keep tracking
of the satellites [11]. Consequently, taking a 2 dB
margin for the CIF, the following criteria are adopted
for the S/N integrity flags:
 When the C/N଴ is less than 27dB-Hz or the
difference between the S/N and the processing
gain is less than 12 dB, the CIF shall be
generated.
 When the C/N଴ is less than 25dB-Hz or the
difference between the S/N and the processing
gain is less than 10 dB, the WIF shall be
generated.
Additionally, with reference to the individual
satellites being tracked, the following additional
criteria are defined:
 The CIF is triggered if there are less than 5
satellites in view (without any individual satellite
CIF)
 The WIF is triggered if less than 5 satellites are
remaining with one or more individual satellite
CIF.
The ABIA system monitors the GNSS performances
and gathers appropriate data to detect a departure
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from the nominal service state. The system also
reports aberrant behaviour to the pilot/autopilot who
in turn is responsible for acting to either modify the
aircraft trajectory (or terminate the service). The
functions are performed in a sequential manner and
each function is modelled as a time-to-complete
process. The cumulative sum of all four function
completion times defines the time required for their
associated integrity assurance process to respond to a
navigation service failure. The response model
provides the overall time-to-complete by considering
the times required for monitoring, detecting,
reporting and reacting (computing and commanding
an optimised trajectory free from GNSS data
degradations) and is given by [1, 14]:
Δt୰ୣ ୱ୮୭୬ୢ = Δt୫ ୭୬୧୲୭୰+  Δtୢ ୲ୣୣ ୡ୲+
Δt୰ୣ ୮୭୰୲+  Δt୰ୣ ୟୡ୲ (13)
ABIA Flight Path Optimisation Module
The ABIA FPOM performs the fundamental task
optimising the RPAS trajectory in line with the
ABIA IFG constraints (CIF/TTC and WIF/TTW).
This problem can be solved like other optimal
control problems by using a variety of direct or
indirect methods. In the initial implementation, a
standard Gauss pseudospectral transcription method
was adopted. However, other techniques can be
adopted for the FPOM module based on numerical
performance requirements (rate of convergence,
stability, etc.) for the specific flight task at hand. In
particular, simpler/faster geometric optimisation
algorithms can be adopted to ensure the real-time
performance of the trajectory optimisation task in
safety-critical DAA applications (e.g., close mid-air
encounters). The ABIA FPOM architecture is
depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4 ABIA FPOM architecture
The RPAS flight dynamics and the IFG driven path
constraints provide the full set of dynamic
constraints to generate flyable trajectories. The
boundary conditions include minimum, maximum,
initial and final values for the state and command
variables. These are provided by the aircraft sensors
(i.e., current flight parameters), and by the FMS (i.e.,
flight plan data). The cost functions represent the
performance criteria that must be minimized. As all
necessary IFG constraints are already included in the
path constraints, the cost functions are based on a
number of key parameters, including minimum time
and minimum fuel (fuel penalty) criteria.
RPAS Dynamics Model
The aircraft dynamics model is a 3-Degree of
Freedom (3-DoF) point mass and unsteady flight
model with variable mass (due to fuel consumption).
The full set of 3-DOF scalar equations is:
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where m is the aircraft mass, V is the aerodynamic
speed, T is the thrust magnitude, α is the angle of
attack, h is the altitude, L is the lift, D is the drag, g is
the nominal acceleration of gravity, γ is the flight
path angle (FPA), ϕ is the bank or roll angle, ψ is the
heading angle, sୱ୤ୡ is the specific fuel consumption,
Φ is the geodetic latitude, θ is the geodetic longitude,r୑ is the meridional radius of curvature and r୘ is the
transverse radius of curvature. Additionally,
aerodynamic and propulsion parameters are
calculated separately.
Detect-and-Avoid system
Both cooperative and non-cooperative DAA systems
are being developed to address RPAS safe
integration into the non-segregated airspace [15].
The DAA capability can be defined as the automatic
detection of possible conflicts (i.e., collision threats)
by the RPAS platform and the implementation of
avoidance manoeuvres to prevent the identified
collision threats. As part of our research, the possible
synergies attainable with the adoption of different
detection, tracking and trajectory generation
algorithms were studied. The combined DAA
architecture is depicted in Figure 5 with an
identification of primary (solid line) and auxiliary
sensors (dashed line) for cooperative and non-
cooperative DAA tasks. An analysis of the available
DAA candidate technologies and the associated
sensors was presented in [16-20]. An approach to the
definition of encounter models and their applications
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on the DAA strategies is presented in [21]
considering both cooperative and non-cooperative
scenarios. The error propagation from different
sources and the impacts of host and intruders
dynamics on the ultimate DAA solution were
investigated [18]. The requirements for developing
an effective DAA system can be derived from the
current regulations applicable for the human pilot
see-and-avoid capability. Criticality analysis is
carried out to prioritize (i.e. to determine if a
collision risk threshold is exceeded for all the tracked
intruders) and to determine the action commands. If
an avoidance action is required, the DAA system
generates and optimises an avoidance trajectory
according to a cost function defined by {minimum
distance, fuel, time and closure rate} with the aid of
differential geometry algorithms to generate a
smooth trajectory.
Figure 5 DAA system architecture
In the non-cooperative scenario, the system employs
navigation-based image stabilization with image
morphology operations and a multi-branch Viterbi
filter for obstacle detection, which allows heading
estimation. The system utilizes a Track-to-Track (T3)
algorithm for data fusion that allows combining data
from different tracks obtained with FLS and/or ADS-
B depending on the scenario. Successively, it utilizes
an Interacting Multiple Model (IMM) algorithm to
estimate the state vector allowing a prediction of the
intruder trajectory over a specified time horizon.
Both in the cooperative and non-cooperative cases,
the risk of collision is evaluated by setting a
threshold on the Probability Density Function (PDF)
of a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) event over the
separation area. So, if the specified threshold is
exceeded, an avoidance manoeuvre is performed
based on a heading-based Differential Geometry
(DG) algorithm and optimized utilizing a cost
function with minimum time constraints and fuel
penalty criteria weighted as a function of separation
distance. A dedicated analysis is performed to
determine the overall uncertainty volume in the
airspace surrounding the intruder track. This is
accomplished by considering both the navigation and
tracking errors affecting the measurements and
translating them to unified range and bearing
uncertainty descriptors. In order to quantify the
errors, let σ୉୶ , σ୉୷ and σ୉୸ represent the standard
deviations of the navigation error (σ୬୶, σ୬୷, σ୬୸) and
tracking error (σ୲୶, σ୲୷, σ୲୸) in the x, y and z cardinal
directions respectively. The range and bearing errors
associated with the intruder tracking process are
transformed into a local Cartesian coordinate frame
(either host or intruder body frame). The overall
uncertainty volume is obtained by combining these
two error ellipsoids using spherical harmonics
decomposition [17].
ABIA/DAA systems integration
The ABIA/DAA integrated architecture is illustrated
in Figure 6. The Position, Velocity and Attitude
(PVA) measurements are obtained from an Extended
Kalman Filter (EKF) that fuses data from GNSS and
other navigation sensors [22-27].
Figure 6 ABIA/DAA integrated architecture
Based on availability, either C-DAA or N-DAA
sensors are used for granting safe separation. In
parallel, the ABIA flight path optimization process
starts when the CIF is generated. Pseudospectral
Optimisation (PSO) or Differential Geometry
Optimization (DGO) techniques are used to generate
a set of optimal trajectory solutions free of near mid-
air conflicts and integrity degradations. The selection
of PSO or DGO is based on the available time
horizons for the ABIA and DAA processes. The
Frenet-Serret equations are used to describe host
RPAS/intruder relative motion [16] and a minimum
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separation distance is defined taking into account the
combined navigation/tracking uncertainty volume. If
the distance between the RPAS and the moving
intruder is or will be less than the separation distance
at a specific time interval, then a conflict condition is
established. Time and fuel are used as criteria in the
cost functional (applying different weightings to
obtain a set of feasible solutions), the dynamic model
is used as the dynamic constraint, and satellite
elevation criteria are used as path constraints.
Boundary conditions are set from the values of flight
parameters when the CIF is generated. The selection
of the optimal trajectory from the generated set of
safe trajectories is performed is based on
minimisation of the following cost function [19, 20]:J = w୲ ∙ tୗ୅୊୉ + w୤න [SFC ∙ T(t)]dt +
−wୢ ∙ D୫ ୧୬− w୧ୢ ∙ ∫ D(t)dt (21)
where:
 D(t) is the estimated distance of the generated
avoidance trajectory points from the avoidance
volume associated with the obstacle.
 D୫ ୧୬ = min[D(t)] is the estimated minimum
distance of the avoidance trajectory from the
avoidance volume.
 tୗ୅୊୉ = t|ୈౣ ౟౤ is the time at which the safe
avoidance condition is successfully attained.
 SFC [୩୥
୒
∙ s] is the specific fuel consumption.
 T(t) is the thrust profile.
 w୲ , w୤, wୢ, w୧ୢ are the weightings attributed to
time, fuel, distance and integral distance
respectively.
In time-critical avoidance applications (i.e., closing-
up obstacles with high relative velocities)
appropriate higher weightings are used for the time
and distance cost elements.
Simulation case studies
A number of simulation case studies were performed
to evaluate the performance of the ABIA and
integrated ABIA/DAA systems. A GNSS
constellation simulator (GCS) was developed to
calculate GNSS satellite position and velocity in the
Earth-Centred Earth-Fixed (ECEF) reference frame
and to obtain satellite visibility data from any point
along the aircraft flight trajectory. The GCS was
implemented in MATLAB® to simulate both GPS
and GALILEO constellations. The satellite position
and velocity were calculated from the Kepler's laws
of orbital motion using either the YUMA or SEM
almanac data [28, 29] for GPS and a standard Walker
constellation (27/3/1), which means 27 satellites in
three Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) planes with 1
active spare satellite per orbital plane. The selected
ABIA/DAA host platform was the AEROSONDE
RPAS and various geometric parameters were
extracted from the literature to draw a detailed 3-D
model of this aircraft [30].
ABIA IFG Simulation
In order to validate the design of the ABIA IFG
module, a MATLAB® simulation activity was
performed employing the algorithms developed
during this research. The simulated AEROSONDE
RPAS trajectory included the following flight phases:
 Climb phase (0-300s);
 Turning climb phase (300-600s);
 Straight and level (cruise) phase (600-900s);
 Level turn phase (900-1200s)
 Turn and descend phase (1200-1500s);
 Approach (straight) phase (1500-1800s);
The combined GPS/GALILEO constellation was
simulated and the GNSS receiver tracking loops
were modelled with a flat random vibration power
curve from 20Hz to 2000Hz with amplitude of
0.005gଶ/Hz and the oscillator vibration sensitivityS஥(f୫ ) = 1 × 10ିଽ parts/g. All CIFs and WIFs
relative to antenna masking, geometric accuracy
degradations, SNR, multipath and Doppler shift were
generated. The main results obtained with the
simulated GPS constellation are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 GPS constellation simulation results
CIF WIF
Climb --- ---
Turning
Climb
334~374s,
426~446s
517~558s
---
Cruise 874~900s ---
Level
Turn 901~1200s
903~906s, 913s, 920~924s,
930~931s, 938~942 s, 948~949s,
956~959s, 966~967s, 974~977s,
984~985s, 992~995s, 1002~1003s,
1110~1113s,
1020~1021s, 1028~1031s,
1128~1129s, 1136~1139s,
1146~1147s, 1154~1157s,
1164~1165s, 1172~1175s,
1182~1183s, 1190~1192s, 1200s
Turning
Descent
1201~1441s,
1448~1464s,
1471~1487s
1494~1500s
1204s, 1223~1224s, 1247~1249s,
1272~1273s, 1296~1297s,
1320~1321s, 1344~1367s, 1368s,
1391~1392s, 1414~1415s,
1438~1439s, 1461~1462s,
1484~1485s
Descent 1503~1800s ---
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In some cases, the CIF was generated but it was not
followed by the WIF (this was due to a temporary
adverse relative geometry not leading to GNSS
signal losses). During the level turn and turning
descent phases, the CIF was followed by the WIF. It
was also observed that the CIF was always triggered
at least 2 seconds before the successive WIF onset
(up to 13 seconds in one case during the turning
descent phase). These results are consistent with
previous ABIA research on manned aircraft
applications [1, 2, 3] and corroborate the validity of
the models developed for the CIF/WIF thresholds. It
is evident that the availability of a usable CIF
represents a significant progress in this research with
the potential for both manned aircraft and RPASs to
recover from mission- and safety-critical flight
conditions potentially leading to GNSS data losses.
Therefore, it is envisaged that a properly designed
ABIA FPM could take full advantage of this
predictive behaviour, allowing the RPAS to correct
its flight trajectory/attitude in order to avoid the
occurrence of the critical GNSS data losses.
Additionally, it is possible that this predictive
behaviour be exploited in the pursuit of a GNSS
based auto-landing capability. These results
corroborate the validity of the models developed for
the CIF/WIF thresholds. It was also observed that
the CIF was always triggered at least 2 seconds
before the successive WIF onset. This evidence is
particularly important for the ABIA system design.
In fact, it is evident that the availability of a usable
CIF represents a significant progress in this research
with the potential for both manned aircraft and
RPASs to recover from mission- and safety-critical
flight conditions potentially leading to GNSS data
losses. Therefore, it is envisaged that a properly
designed ABIA FPM could take full advantage of
this predictive behaviour, allowing the RPAS to
correct its flight trajectory/attitude in order to avoid
the occurrence of the critical GNSS data losses.
Additionally, it is possible that this predictive
behaviour be exploited in the pursuit of a GNSS
based auto-landing capability.
ABIA/DAA simulation
The integration of ABIA into an existing RPAS
DAA architecture was studied in various C-DAA and
N-DAA scenarios. The test platforms used were:
 AEROSONDE RPAS (ABIA/DAA host
platform);
 AIRBUS 320 (A320) and AEROSONDE RPAS
intruders.
In all test cases, an avoidance volume (sum of
navigation and tracking errors) was generated by the
DAA system [17]. PSO or DGO techniques were
used to generate the new (optimal) trajectory based
on the available time to conflict (i.e., host entering
the avoidance volume). The avoidance trajectory was
initiated by the DAA system when the probability of
collision exceeded the required threshold value.
Time, fuel, distance and integral distance were used
in the cost functional, the RPAS 3-DOF dynamic
model was used as dynamic constraint, and the
minimum elevation criteria as path constraint for
both PSO and DGO techniques. Boundary conditions
were set from the values of the flight parameters at
the first CIF epoch. Figure 7 illustrates the C-DAA
test scenario where two AEROSONDE RPASs (1
ABIA host platform and 1 intruder) are 90 off track
on the same Flight Level (FL). The risk of collision
is detected and resolved. The host RPAS platform
equipped with ABIA/DAA is able to generate an
avoidance trajectory which is free from CIF/WIF
occurrences. As depicted in Figure 7, the host RPAS
DAA avoidance trajectory and the ABIA/DAA
avoidance trajectory have a different rejoin point on
the original track. To provide clarity, three different
points are shown on the ABIA/DAA host platform
trajectory:
 DAA Break-off Point: Corresponding to the point
where the host UA initiates the avoidance
trajectory (commanded by the DAA system). The
cost function criteria adopted in this case is
minimum time.
 DAA Safe Manoeuvring Point: Corresponding to
the point where the host RPAS can manoeuvre
safely (any manoeuvre within its operational
flight envelope) has 0 ROC. From this point
onwards the DAA cost function criteria switches
to minimum time and minimum fuel to get back
on the original (desired) track.
 ABIA Re-join Point: Corresponding to the point
where the host RPAS re-joins the original
(desired) track without GNSS data degradations.
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DAA Break-off Point
DAA Safe Manoeuvring Point
ABIA Re-join Point
GNSS Data Loss – DAA Commanded
Trajectory (without ABIA)
Host Platform ABIA/DAA
Intruder Platform
Figure 7 Simulation scenario and illustration of reference points
The horizontal separation and predicted conflict
probability in this case are shown in Figure 8 and 9
respectively.
Figure 8 Obtained horizontal separation
Figure 9 Predicted conflict probability
Figure 10 illustrates the N-DAA test scenario where
the AEROSONDE RPAS (ABIA/DAA host platform)
and an A320 are flying on the same FL but 90 off
track to each other.
Host Platform ABIA/DAA
Intruder Platform
Figure 10 90º non-cooperative DAA scenario
The horizontal and vertical separation obtained is
illustrated in Figure 11.
Figure 11 Horizontal and vertical separation
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Figure 12 illustrates a C-DAA test scenario where
the ABIA host platform (AEROSONDE RPAS) and
two intruders (two other AEROSONDE RPASs) are
on the same FL.
Conflict Resolution
Host Platform ABIA/DAA
Intruder Platform
Figure 12 Three RPAS cooperative DAA scenario
One intruder RPAS is 90 off track and the other is
following a head-on path with the host RPAS. The
horizontal and vertical separation obtained with
respect to intruder 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figure 13
and 14 respectively.
Figure 13 Horizontal and vertical separation of
intruder 1
Figure 14 Horizontal and vertical separation of
intruder 2
The simulation results demonstrate that the ABIA
IFG module is capable of generating integrity flags
to provide both caution and warning signals when
GNSS signals are degraded or lost. After the
integrity caution flag is generated, the time available
for the pilot/autopilot to react (before the integrity
event is detected and the warning flag is generated),
is at least 2 seconds. This TTC can support safety-
critical tasks including GLS curved/segmented
precision approach and automatic landing
applications. Data analysis shows that the ABIA
system can provide useful integrity signals for CAT-
III precision approach and automatic landing
(automated and real-time FPO is essential in this
case). In the C-DAA and N-DAA scenarios
investigated and in the dynamic conditions explored,
all near mid-air collision threats were successfully
avoided by implementing adequate trajectory
optimisation algorithms. Both PSO and DGO
algorithms proved successful in C-DAA and N-DAA
scenarios depending on the available time for the
optimisation loops (distance host-intruders and
relative dynamics).
Conclusions and future work
In this research the synergies between a GNSS ABIA
system and a novel RPAS DAA architecture for
cooperative and non-cooperative applications were
explored. The integration of ABIA with DAA leads
to an Integrity Augmented DAA (IAS) solution,
which can potentially support the safe and
unrestricted access of RPAS to commercial airspace.
Simulation case studies were performed for the
ABIA IFG module, IFG/FPOM modules and
ABIA/DAA integration. The trajectory optimization
problem was mathematically formulated and the
real-time capability of the FPOM was verified. From
the results of the simulation activity, the following
conclusions are drawn:
 The ABIA IFG module is capable of generating
integrity flags to provide both caution
(predictive) and warning signals to the pilot when
GNSS signals are degraded or lost.
 After the CIF is generated, the time available for
the pilot/autopilot to react before the WIF is
generated, is sufficient for safety-critical tasks
including GLS curved/segmented approach and
automatic landing applications.
 Data analysis shows that the ABIA system can
provide the level of integrity required for CAT-
IIIC precision approach, which are currently
unavailable with LAAS.
 The ABIA integration into an existing RPAS
DAA architecture proved that all near mid-air
collision threats were successfully avoided by
implementing suitable trajectory optimisation
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algorithms.
 The proposed ABIA/DAA integration
architecture is capable of achieving adequate
performance by avoiding critical satellite data
losses while fulfilling the separation requirements
set for DAA.
Additional long-term objectives of this research
include the following:
 Investigate and compare different types of
avionics sensor technologies and their potential to
support the design of robust ABAS/ABIA
architectures for manned aircraft and RPASs.
 Extend the ABAS/ABIA concepts to the
Aeronautical Data Link (ADL) application
domain and investigate ABIA Line-of-Sight
(LOS) and Beyond-Line-of-Sight (BLOS)
communication interfaces for RPAS applications.
 Investigate ABIA evolutions for Next Generation
Flight Management System (NG-FMS)
applications [31-36]:
- Trajectory Optimization for Future CNS+A
systems.
- 4DT Intent Based Operations.
- NG-FMS/ABIA Integration.
 Study possible applications of the ABAS/ABIA
concepts to advanced mission planning and
forensic (accident investigation) applications.
 Evaluate the potential of ABAS/ABIA to enhance
the performance of next generation CNS/ATM
systems for Performance/Intent Based Operations
(PBO/IBO) and Four-Dimensional Trajectory
(4DT) management [37].
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